Abstract. In collective decision-making, impatient voters are attractive allies if some group members want to stop deliberations to decide for their favored alternative. Competition for their votes can lead to hasty outcomes through strategic complementarity in the stopping decision. Simple majority rule may not be robust in that one very impatient agent can cause the whole group to rush to a decision. This can be avoided by super-majority rule. Moreover the impacts of impatient voters and patient voters are not symmetric: one extremely patient agent will not cause the group to deliberate without end under super-majority rule un-less unanimity is required. JEL classification. D71, D72, D8
CNRS 2 ; AERES AInternational audienceThe main criticism to the aggregation of individual preference...
We develop a simple model that accounts for the widely spread intuition that as committees get large...
I analyze symmetric majority rule voting equilibria when voters wish to elect the better candidate a...
We consider a model in which voters over time receive more information about their preferences conc...
Majority rule is, generally speaking, not an optimal decision-making process. Impor-tant among its a...
We consider a model in which voters over time receive more information about their preferences conce...
We consider a model in which voters over time receive more information about their preferences conce...
A committee is choosing from two alternatives. If required supermajority is not reached, voting is r...
Abstract When sharing a common goal, confident and competent members are often motivated to contribu...
We present a dynamic model of sequential information acquisition by a heterogeneous committee. At ea...
We examine the timing of group decisions that are taken by weighted voting. Decision-making is in tw...
Under the unanimity rule, a single voter may alter a decision that is unanimously accepted by all ot...
The widely discussed `discursive dilemma' shows that majority voting in a group of individuals on lo...
I discuss instances where a committee wants to deviate from the simple majority rule by adopting an ...
We consider a superior decision rule for making collective choices. In our framework the optimal dec...
CNRS 2 ; AERES AInternational audienceThe main criticism to the aggregation of individual preference...
We develop a simple model that accounts for the widely spread intuition that as committees get large...
I analyze symmetric majority rule voting equilibria when voters wish to elect the better candidate a...
We consider a model in which voters over time receive more information about their preferences conc...
Majority rule is, generally speaking, not an optimal decision-making process. Impor-tant among its a...
We consider a model in which voters over time receive more information about their preferences conce...
We consider a model in which voters over time receive more information about their preferences conce...
A committee is choosing from two alternatives. If required supermajority is not reached, voting is r...
Abstract When sharing a common goal, confident and competent members are often motivated to contribu...
We present a dynamic model of sequential information acquisition by a heterogeneous committee. At ea...
We examine the timing of group decisions that are taken by weighted voting. Decision-making is in tw...
Under the unanimity rule, a single voter may alter a decision that is unanimously accepted by all ot...
The widely discussed `discursive dilemma' shows that majority voting in a group of individuals on lo...
I discuss instances where a committee wants to deviate from the simple majority rule by adopting an ...
We consider a superior decision rule for making collective choices. In our framework the optimal dec...
CNRS 2 ; AERES AInternational audienceThe main criticism to the aggregation of individual preference...
We develop a simple model that accounts for the widely spread intuition that as committees get large...
I analyze symmetric majority rule voting equilibria when voters wish to elect the better candidate a...